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LEFEMINE v. WIDEMAN: ENTRENCHING JUDICIAL CONFUSION 
AND BECKONING A MORE STREAMLINED ANALYSIS OF FIRST 
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS IN THE ANTI-ABORTION PROTEST 
CONTEXT 
BLAKE LAUREN WALSH∗ 
In Lefemine v. Wideman,1 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit sought to resolve whether the law enforcement officers who 
engaged in impermissible content-based restrictions on Petitioner 
Steven Lefemine’s rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution by restricting a roadside anti-abortion demonstration 
were entitled to qualified immunity.2  The Fourth Circuit also exam-
ined whether the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina 
“abused its discretion by failing to rule on [Lefemine’s] request for 
declaratory relief[, and] by failing to award [Lefemine] attorney’s 
fees,” and erred by granting injunctive relief to [Lefemine].3  While 
neither party addressed the First Amendment issue on appeal,4 the 
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 1.  672 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 9 (2012). 
 2.  Id. at 297. 
 3.  Id.  The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Lefemine with re-
spect to his First Amendment claim but held that the law enforcement officers were enti-
tled to qualified immunity.  Lefemine v. Davis, 732 F. Supp. 2d 614, 624, 627 (D.S.C. 
2010), aff’d, Lefemine v. Wideman 672 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 
133 S. Ct. 9 (2012). 
 4.  Lefemine, 672 F.3d at 297 (“[N]o one challenges the fundamental conclusion that 
[the] Defendants’ actions were an impermissible content-based restriction on [the] Plain-
tiff’s First Amendment[] rights.”).  In accepting this “fundamental conclusion,” the Fourth 
Circuit “pass[ed] no judgment on whether the district court was correct in its determina-
tion.”  Id. 
  
2013] LEFEMINE v. WIDEMAN 1379 
Fourth Circuit noted, albeit briefly, that at the time of Lefemine’s 
demonstration in 2005, case law from the Fourth Circuit and the Su-
preme Court of the United States was unclear as to how courts should 
review the constitutionality of restrictions on speech when faced with 
restrictions on anti-abortion protest speech.5  The district court, how-
ever, had explored the issue in greater detail.6  The Fourth Circuit ul-
timately concluded the officers were entitled to qualified immunity 
and that the district court had not abused its discretion.7 
Indeed, each party accepted on appeal the district court’s con-
clusion that the officers’ actions violated Lefemine’s First Amendment 
rights to freedom of speech and assembly.8  In framing its qualified 
immunity analysis, however, the Fourth Circuit relied on ambiguous 
precedent surrounding the distinction between content-based and 
content-neutral restrictions on speech.9  This conflicting case law, as 
the district court and the Fourth Circuit in Lefemine articulated, lends 
support to the view that there is no conceptual room for a two-tiered 
scheme of content-based and content-neutral restrictions on speech 
in the context of anti-abortion speech.10  Due to the emotionally 
charged and socially divisive nature of abortion, the two-tiered 
scheme only sows judicial confusion and furthers jurisprudential in-
consistency.  Application of a single strict scrutiny standard to re-
strictions on anti-abortion speech, while certainly not infallible, would 
help to resolve this ambiguity.11  In the end, the impetus for applying 
any standard to review restrictions on anti-abortion protest speech 
must hold fast to the principles set forth in the Supreme Court’s most 
prominent trio of abortion cases—Roe v. Wade,12 Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,13 and Gonzales v. Carhart14—because 
of the unique nature of the Court’s abortion jurisprudence.15 
                                                        
 5.  See id. at 299–301 (citing ambiguous case law from the Fourth Circuit and the Su-
preme Court concerning the question of whether requesting that demonstrators remove 
protest signs containing “large, graphic photographs” constitutes “an impermissible in-
fringement of their First Amendment rights”).  
 6.  Lefemine, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 620–24 (reasoning that the “blanket ban” on all graph-
ic signs was not “narrowly tailored” to the purported “compelling interest” in protecting 
young children from graphic visual displays and concluding that the ban violated Lefem-
ine’s First Amendment rights).   
 7.  Lefemine, 672 F.3d at 301–04.   
 8.  Id. at 297. 
 9.  See infra Part IV.A.  Part IV.A will likewise address how the district court, in framing 
its analysis and making its determination about Lefemine’s First Amendment freedoms of 
speech and assembly, relied on the same backdrop of ambiguous precedent. 
 10.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 11.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 12.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 13.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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I.  THE CASE 
On November 3, 2005, in Greenwood County, South Carolina, 
Steven C. Lefemine endeavored to stage a Christian pro-life demon-
stration at the “busiest intersection in [the] County.”16  Lefemine was 
the sole proprietor of the Columbia Christians for Life Counsel 
(”CCL”), an anti-abortion organization.17  Twenty other “‘like-minded 
persons,’” accompanying Lefemine and preaching and carrying signs, 
intended “‘to shock the consciences of those who s[aw] the signs to 
the horror of abortion.’”18  During the demonstration, Lieutenant 
Randy Miles of the Greenwood County Sheriff’s Office notified Major 
Lonnie Smith “of complaints that had been received from motorists 
driving near the intersection.”19  Lt. Miles then informed Lefemine 
“that he ‘had [received] several complaints about the graphic photo-
graphs and [that] this was creating a disturbance in the traffic flow.’”20  
Thereafter, Major Smith and Deputy Brandon Strickland arrived on 
the scene of the protest demonstration to investigate.21 
Major Smith instructed Lefemine and the other demonstrators to 
remove the signs because they were “offensive,” but told them they 
could continue their protest without the signs.22  Lefemine responded 
that “[b]eing offensive is not a basis for violating First Amendment 
rights” and argued that his signs were not obscene.23  Following his 
conversation with Major Smith, Lefemine and the other demonstra-
tors removed their signs, ended their protest, and left the scene.24 
                                                        
 14.   550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 15.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 16.  Lefemine v. Davis, 732 F. Supp. 2d 614, 617 (D.S.C. 2010) (citations omitted), 
aff’d, Lefemine v. Wideman, 672 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. 
Ct. 9 (2012).  
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id. (citation omitted).  In particular, these signs “‘depict[ed] aborted babies.’”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  
 19.  Id. (citation omitted).  Lt. Miles informed Major Smith of one particular com-
plaint from a “mother [who] called saying that her son ‘was in the backseat screaming, cry-
ing because [he] had seen those signs.’”  Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 20.  Id. at 617–18 (citation omitted). 
 21.  Id. (citation omitted).  Major Smith “observed a number of individuals holding 
signs and megaphones.”  Id. at 618 (citation omitted).  Before he approached the CCL 
demonstrators, Major Smith reported the events to Chief Deputy Mike Frederick.  Id. at 
617–18 (citation omitted).  Chief Deputy Frederick instructed Major Smith “‘to tell [the 
protesters] that they could continue to protest but they would either have to put away or 
take down the signs or . . . possibly be ticketed for breach of peace.’”  Id. at 618.  
 22.  Id.  Specifically, Major Smith told Lefemine: “This is offensive because you’ve got 
small children—you’ve got different ones that are seeing this.  We have had so many com-
plaints about people that this is offensive.”  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 619 (citation omitted). 
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One year later, on November 13, 2006, “an attorney from the Na-
tional Legal Foundation (‘NLF’) wrote a letter to Sheriff Dan Wide-
man” of the Greenwood County Sheriff’s Office and to Chief Gerald 
Brooks of the City of Greenwood Police Department to forewarn the 
officers that CCL volunteers planned to return to the Greenwood ar-
ea to “‘highlight[] the national tragedy of abortion.’”25  The letter de-
clared that any disruption of CCL’s efforts would leave CCL with no 
other option than “‘to pursue all available legal remedies without fur-
ther notice.’”26  Chief Brooks responded “that CCL was welcome to 
visit the community and properly exercise their [First Amendment] 
rights.”27  In a separate response, however, Chief Deputy Mike Freder-
ick cautioned NLF “that Major Smith’s response in 2005 was based on 
CCL’s methodology not their content.”28  If any officer observed be-
havior similar to that present at the November 2005 protest, Chief 
Deputy Mike Frederick further warned, the demonstrators would be 
ordered to cease their behavior or alternatively face criminal charg-
es.29  Out of fear of being subjected to criminal sanctions from 
Greenwood County, Lefemine and the other protesters conducted 
their demonstrations on the Greenwood City side of the intersection 
on November 26, 2006 and on another occasion in 2007.30 
On October 31, 2008, Lefemine, on behalf of himself and CCL, 
filed suit against Sheriff Wideman, former Chief Deputy Frederick, 
Major Smith, and Deputy Strickland (collectively, the “defendants”) 
alleging violations of his First Amendment rights.31  On April 5, 2010, 
Lefemine and the defendants filed cross-motions for summary judg-
ment.32  The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina 
held a hearing on the cross-motions on June 23, 2010.33 
Lefemine brought his lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,34 seeking 
damages, as well as “injunctive and declaratory relief[,] for the viola-
                                                        
 25.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 26.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 27.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 30.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 31.  Id.  Lefemine subsequently filed an amended complaint, adding Sheriff Tony Da-
vis as a defendant.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 619–20. 
 34.  Section 1983 permits an individual to bring a lawsuit against a person who, while 
acting “under color of any [state law],” violated the individual’s constitutional rights.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
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tion of his rights of free speech, peaceable assembly, and the free ex-
ercise of religion” under the First Amendment.35  Lefemine argued 
that the defendants’ demand that the CCL demonstrators remove 
their signs was “improperly based on” the public’s reaction to the con-
tent of the expression.36  In response, the defendants argued that 
Lefemine had failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights 
and emphasized “that their restrictions on CCL’s speech constituted a 
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.”37  The district court 
reviewing the totality of the evidence within the record, found that 
the defendants’ restriction on Lefemine’s and CCL’s speech was 
based on content.38  The court highlighted that because “[c]ontent-
based restrictions on speech ‘are presumptively invalid and subject to 
strict scrutiny,’”39 the defendants’ restriction must be narrowly tai-
lored to achieve a compelling state interest.40  The defendants alleged 
that the government had a compelling interest in traffic safety and 
protecting young children,41 but the district court noted two weak-
nesses in the defendants’ argument.  First, the district court observed 
that Major Smith never mentioned traffic safety in his conversation 
with Lefemine on November 3, 2005; second, the district court 
acknowledged that a blanket ban on all graphic images to protect 
small children failed the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny 
test.42  The district court then granted Lefemine’s motion for sum-
mary judgment as to his First Amendment claims based on the free-
doms of speech and assembly.43 
                                                        
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.”). 
 35.  Lefemine, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (citation omitted). 
 36.  Id. at 620–21 (citations omitted). 
 37.  Id. at 620 (citation omitted).  The district court noted that a state’s right to restrict 
private expression in traditional public forums is limited, observing that, while the state 
“‘may impose reasonable content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions . . . it may 
regulate [private expression] only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to 
serve a compelling state interest.’”  Id. at 620–21 (quoting Capitol Square Review & Adviso-
ry Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995)).  For a more detailed discussion of the distinc-
tion between content-based and content-neutral restrictions on protected speech, see infra 
Part II.A.   
 38.  Lefemine, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 621.  The district court further noted that the defend-
ants confused “viewpoint neutrality” with “content neutrality,” reasoning that “their re-
striction [wa]s content-neutral because it was not motivated by disapproval or disagree-
ment with Plaintiff’s pro-life stance.”  Id.   
 39.  Id. at 622 (quoting Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009)). 
 40.  Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983)). 
 41.  Id. at 622-23. 
 42.  Id. at 623–24. 
 43.  Id. at 624.  Lefemine also sought summary judgment on his free exercise of reli-
gion claim.  He claimed that “‘[i]n the exercise of his religious beliefs, CCL either displays 
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In their cross-motion for summary judgment, the “Defendants al-
lege[d] that they [we]re entitled to qualified immunity because there 
was no clearly established law indicating that their conduct would vio-
late [Lefemine]’s constitutional rights.”44  Relying on U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent, the district court first established that 
“‘[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally 
are . . . shielded from liability for civil damages [only] insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”45  The dis-
trict court then emphasized that the Supreme Court’s two-part test for 
resolving qualified immunity claims—first proposed in Saucier v. Katz46 
and later suggested as a discretionary standard in Pearson v. Calla-
han47—should guide the qualified immunity analysis in the present 
case.48 
Applying the Saucier test and finding a constitutional violation of 
Lefemine’s First Amendment rights, the district court then reasoned 
that the primary question “becomes whether a reasonable officer 
could have believed that prohibiting demonstrators from displaying 
large signs containing pictures of dismembered, aborted fetuses at a 
major intersection was lawful, in light of clearly established First 
Amendment law and the information they possessed.”49  The district 
court emphasized that in November 2005, no clearly established law 
                                                        
or supervises the display of pro-life signs.’”  Id.  While Lefemine’s free exercise of religion 
claim falls outside the scope of this Note, the district court similarly granted Lefemine’s 
motion for summary judgment with respect to this claim.  Id. at 625. 
 44.  Id. (citation omitted).   
 45.  Id. (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999)).  The district court 
acknowledged that, as a practical matter, whether an officer is protected by qualified im-
munity “turns on the objective legal reasonableness of [his] action[s].”  Id. (quoting Wil-
son, 526 U.S. at 614) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Furthermore, the district court 
noted that “‘[c]learly established for purposes of qualified immunity means that [t]he con-
tours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand 
that what he is doing violates that right.’”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson, 526 
U.S. at 614–15).   
 46.  533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
 47.  555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
 48.  See Lefemine, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 625–26 (“The court finds that the Saucier proce-
dure is worthwhile in the instant case . . . .”).  The district court observed that the two-part 
test for resolving qualified immunity claims requires that the plaintiff first establish a con-
stitutional violation, and only then can the court “decide[] whether the right at issue was 
‘clearly established’ at the time of” the alleged violation.  Id. at 625 (quoting Pearson, 555 
U.S. at 232) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The district court noted that, while Pear-
son adopted the two-part test from Saucier, the Pearson Court also established that district 
court judges should be given latitude in exercising their own judgment regarding which of 
the two qualified immunity prongs to address first in a particular case.  Id. (citing Pearson, 
555 U.S. at 236).   
 49.  Id. at 626.  
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existed in the Fourth Circuit addressing the extent to which officers 
may prohibit the use of photographs depicting aborted fetuses in 
public forums.50  The district court concluded that, in light of the spe-
cific facts of the instant case, the current state of First Amendment 
law, and the general knowledge the officers possessed when they act-
ed, “it was not unreasonable for Defendants to believe that their pro-
hibition was lawful.”51  As a result, the district court granted the de-
fendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment on the qualified 
immunity claim, determining that the defendants were immune from 
suit in their individual and official capacities.52 
Lefemine and the defendants filed cross-appeals to the Fourth 
Circuit challenging different portions of the district court’s opinion,53 
but neither party challenged the basic premise that the “Defendants’ 
actions were an impermissible content-based restriction on [Lefem-
ine]’s First Amendment[] rights.”54 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly 
form the bedrock of American democracy.55  As the Supreme Court 
recently re-affirmed in Snyder v. Phelps,56 “[t]he First Amendment re-
flects ‘a profound national commitment to the principle that debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’”57  
Nevertheless, the Snyder Court also acknowledged that “‘[n]ot all 
speech is of equal First Amendment importance’” and that “where 
matters of purely private significance are at issue, First Amendment 
protections are often less rigorous.”58 
With regard to protest speech in particular, the interweaving of 
the right to protest with First Amendment protections first emerged 
                                                        
 50.  Id.   
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 625, 627.  Based on a review of “the totality of the facts in this case,” the dis-
trict court denied Lefemine’s request for attorney’s fees.  Id. at 627. 
 53.  Lefemine v. Wideman, 672 F.3d 292, 295 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 
133 S. Ct. 9 (2012). 
 54.  Id. at 297.   
 55.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .”); R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S 377, 430 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“‘If 
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government 
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself of-
fensive or disagreeable.’” (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989))). 
 56.  131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 57.  Id. at 1215 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 58.  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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during the labor union protests in the early twentieth century.59  In 
Thornhill v. Alabama,60 the Supreme Court further acknowledged the 
distinction between violent and peaceful protests.61  More than forty 
years later, the Court elaborated on the distinction between peaceful 
protests and those involving violent and threatening conduct in 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Company.62  The Court acknowledged 
that the First Amendment protects “‘the opportunity to persuade 
[others] to action, not merely to describe facts.’”63  Claiborne involved 
an NAACP-staged boycott of white merchants stemming from wide-
spread dissatisfaction with an inadequate response to “a list of particu-
larized demands for racial equality and integration” presented to 
white elected officials in Claiborne County, Mississippi; the business 
owners subsequently filed suit “to recover losses caused by the boycott 
and to enjoin future boycott activity.”64  The Claiborne Court drew up-
on its decision in Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing 
v. City of Berkeley,65 which it decided only a year prior, to support its de-
termination that the petitioners’ boycott involved constitutionally 
protected activity.66 
                                                        
 59.  See Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911) (“Society itself 
is an organization, and does not object to organizations for social, religious, business, and 
all legal purposes.  The law, therefore, recognizes the right of workingmen to unite and to 
invite others to join their ranks, thereby making available the strength, influence, and 
power that come from such association.”).   
 60.  310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
 61.  See id. at 104 (“[T]he group in power at any moment may not impose penal sanc-
tions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public interest merely on a showing 
that others may thereby be persuaded to take action inconsistent with its interests.”).  In 
Thornhill, the petitioner participated in a picket line at his place of employment in viola-
tion of an Alabama statute that made it unlawful to picket near a place of business “with-
out a just cause or legal excuse.”  Id. at 91–92, 94–95.  The Supreme Court held that the 
Alabama statute was unconstitutional because it foreclosed any and all means by which a 
protester could peacefully disseminate his views to the public on a matter of public con-
cern.  See id. at 98–99, 104–05 (“[The statute] has been applied by the State courts so as to 
prohibit a single individual from walking slowly and peacefully back and forth on the pub-
lic sidewalk in front of the premises of an employer, without speaking to anyone . . . .”). 
 62.  See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913, 916 (1982) (stating that 
the states do not have a “right to prohibit peaceful political activity such as that found in 
the boycott in this case,” but noting that “[t]he First Amendment does not protect vio-
lence”). 
 63.  Id. at 910 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945)).  The Court em-
phasized that “[t]hrough speech, assembly, and petition—rather than through riot or rev-
olution—petitioners sought to change a social order that had consistently treated them as 
second-class citizens.”  Id. at 912. 
 64.  Id. at 889. 
 65.  454 U.S. 290 (1981). 
 66.  See Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 907 (observing that “[t]he black citizens named as De-
fendants in this action banded together and collectively expressed their dissatisfaction with 
a social structure that had denied them rights to equal treatment and respect” and that 
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While First Amendment protection of protest speech is certainly 
not absolute,67 the content-based versus content-neutral distinction 
for determining the permissibility of speech restrictions places certain 
limits on the government’s ability to impede otherwise constitutional-
ly protected speech.68  The interplay between content-based and con-
tent-neutral restrictions on speech has unique implications for anti-
abortion protests due to the emotionally charged nature of the top-
ic.69  In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized certain catego-
ries of government interests that are sufficiently compelling to justify 
intrusions on protected speech.70  Although the trio of Roe, Casey, and 
Gonzales does not fall within the realm of First Amendment jurispru-
dence, the cases will frame the discussion in this Note because these 
prominent cases notably address the relationship between the gov-
ernment’s interest in protecting human life, on the one hand, and a 
pregnant woman’s constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy, 
on the other hand.71 
A.  The Content-Based Versus Content-Neutral Distinction Limits the 
Government’s Power to Impede Speech 
The government’s ability to restrict expressive speech in public 
forums is limited.72  As the Supreme Court re-articulated in Hudgens v. 
NLRB,73 “streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places are 
so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights 
that access to them for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot 
constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely.”74  Nevertheless, 
the fact that the public commonly traffics a particular area of public 
property does not automatically transform the property into a “public 
forum” within which the government’s ability to restrict expressive 
                                                        
“th[is] practice of persons sharing common views banding together to achieve a common 
end is deeply embedded in the American political process” (quoting Citizens Against Rent 
Control, 454 U.S. at 294)). 
 67.  See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The protections afforded by the 
First Amendment, however, are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the gov-
ernment may regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.”). 
 68.  See infra Part II.A. 
 69.  See infra Part II.B. 
 70.  See infra Part II.C. 
 71.  See infra Part II.D. 
 72.  See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“In 
places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and 
debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”). 
 73.  424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
 74.  Id. at 515 (quoting Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley 
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 315 (1968)).   
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speech is more circumscribed.75  In a traditional public forum, namely 
streets, public sidewalks, and parks, a state “may impose reasonable, 
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions . . . but it may 
regulate expressive content only if such a restriction is necessary, and 
narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest.”76  A government 
restriction on speech in a public forum must satisfy four elements to 
withstand the level of scrutiny applied to content-neutral time, place, 
and manner (“TPM”) restrictions on speech.77  The standard for TPM 
restrictions occupies “what has come to be known as ‘intermediate 
scrutiny.’”78  The intermediate scrutiny standard for content-neutral 
TPM restrictions stands in stark contrast to the strict scrutiny standard 
applied to content-based restrictions on protected speech.79 
Case law addressing content-based restrictions on speech is not 
limited to discerning an intent to limit speech; instead, case law sug-
gests that restrictions on the content of speech occur along a fluid 
spectrum.  At the most prejudicial end of the spectrum are viewpoint-
based restrictions, whereby a law carries a specific prejudice toward a 
certain point of view related to a given topic.80  The “symbolic 
                                                        
 75.  See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (disagreeing with the argument 
“that whenever members of the public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or oper-
ated by the Government, then that place becomes a ‘public forum’ for purposes of the 
First Amendment” and instead declaring that “[s]uch a principle of constitutional law has 
never existed, and does not exist now”). 
 76.  Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995). 
 77.  United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (“[T]he government may enforce 
reasonable [TPM] regulations as long as the restrictions ‘are [(1)] content-neutral, are 
[(2)] narrowly tailored to serve a [(3)] significant government interest, and [(4)] leave 
open ample alternative channels of communication.’” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. 
at 45)).  
 78.  Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 791 (1994) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also id. (further explaining that 
TPM restrictions on speech are subject to intermediate scrutiny, which is the “midway be-
tween the ‘strict scrutiny’ demanded for content-based regulation of speech and the ‘ra-
tional basis’ standard that is applied . . . to government regulation of nonspeech activi-
ties”). 
 79.  Compare Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (“The state may also enforce regulations 
of the [TPM] of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a sig-
nificant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communica-
tion.”), with id. (“For the state to enforce a content-based exclusion [in a traditional public 
forum] it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and 
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”). 
 80.  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(“When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers 
on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.  Viewpoint dis-
crimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.” (internal citation omit-
ted)).   
  
1388 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1378 
speech”81 line of cases is particularly illustrative of viewpoint discrimi-
nation.82  Regulations based on viewpoint discrimination are “‘pre-
sumptively invalid.’”83 On the other end of the spectrum are the least 
prejudicial restrictions—content-neutral regulations.84  As the Su-
preme Court has noted, “the content neutrality principle is [general-
ly] invoked when the government has imposed restrictions on speech 
related to an entire subject area.”85  Thus, “[t]he content neutrality 
principle can be seen as an outgrowth of the core First Amendment 
prohibition against viewpoint discrimination.”86  According to the Su-
preme Court, the primary inquiry shaping the content neutrality de-
termination “is whether the government has adopted a regulation of 
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”87 
Despite the seemingly fluid spectrum of content-related re-
strictions on speech, Supreme Court precedent in the area is at best 
unclear and ambiguous.  In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,88 
for example, the Court acknowledged that the content-related analy-
                                                        
 81.  The Supreme Court noted in Virginia v. Black that “[t]he First Amendment affords 
protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.” 538 U.S. 343, 358 
(2003).  But see id. at 361, 363 (noting that the protection is not absolute and determining 
that even though “cross burning is symbolic expression,” Virginia was constitutionally 
permitted “to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate”).  
 82.  See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510–11 
(1969) (declaring unconstitutional a decision by school officials to prohibit students from 
wearing black armbands to protest the war in Vietnam even though other similarly politi-
cal symbolic forms of protest were permitted). But see Black, 538 U.S. at 363 (“The First 
Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate 
because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation.”). 
 83.  See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 353 (2009) (“Restrictions on 
speech based on its content are ‘presumptively invalid’ and subject to strict scrutiny.” (cita-
tion omitted)).   
 84.  See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Svc. Comm’n of N.Y, 447 U.S. 530, 536 
(1980) (noting that TPM “regulations must be ‘applicable to all speech irrespective of con-
tent’” and that “[a] restriction that regulates only the [TPM] of speech may be imposed so 
long as it is reasonable” (citation omitted)). 
 85.  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 59 (1983) (empha-
sis added). 
 86.  Id.; see also Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 447 U.S. at 536 (“Governmental action 
that regulates speech on the basis of its subject matter ‘slip[s] from the neutrality of time, 
place, and circumstance into a concern about content.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972))); see also Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (“The 
central problem with Chicago’s ordinance is that it describes permissible picketing in 
terms of its subject matter.  Peaceful picketing on the subject of a school’s labor-
management dispute is permitted, but all other peaceful picketing is prohibited.”). 
 87.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (emphasis added); see also 
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (“Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on con-
tent alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone.” (emphasis added)). 
 88.  512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
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sis is not straightforward in application.89  With few exceptions, how-
ever, the Court has treated laws as content-based that explicitly classify 
expression on the basis of discrete categories of subject matter or 
viewpoints.90  The Court did, however, carve out a limited exception 
to this general rule in Young v. American Mini Theatres91—the Court 
referenced the “secondary effects” doctrine to justify a zoning ordi-
nance that differentiated between movie theaters that did and did not 
“exhibit sexually explicit ‘adult’ movies.”92  Ten years later, in City of 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,93 the Court relied on Young and re-
affirmed that a neutral justification can render an otherwise facially 
discriminatory law content-neutral.94  Specifically, the Renton Court 
acknowledged that the City of Renton’s “‘predominate’ intent” was 
“to prevent crime, protect the city’s retail trade, maintain property 
values, and generally ‘protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the 
city’s] neighborhoods,’” which the Court determined was sufficient 
justification for classifying an ordinance “that prohibits adult motion 
picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential 
zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school” as 
                                                        
 89.  Id. at 642–43 (“Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or con-
tent neutral is not always a simple task. . . .  [W]hile a content-based purpose may be suffi-
cient in certain circumstances to show that a regulation is content based, it is not necessary 
to such a showing in all cases.  Nor will the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose be 
enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 90.  See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (concluding that the Communi-
cations Decency Act, or “CDA[,] applies broadly to the entire universe of cyberspace[, and 
t]hus . . . is a content-based blanket restriction on speech”); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 
321 (1988) (noting that a District of Columbia law prohibiting displays of signs critical of 
foreign government within 500 feet of the embassies of those governments was content-
based because it “[wa]s justified only by reference to the content of the speech”). 
 91.  427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
 92.  Id. at 52.  See also id. at 71 n.34 (“The [Detroit] Common Council’s determination 
was that a concentration of ‘adult’ movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and be-
come a focus of crime, effects which are not attributable to theaters showing other types of 
films.  It is this secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the 
dissemination of ‘offensive’ speech.” (plurality opinion)).  For a more recent judicial fram-
ing of the secondary effects doctrine—and operating in a similar context—see City of Erie 
v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 278, 295 (2000) (addressing the constitutionality of a city or-
dinance making it a crime to appear in public “in a state of nudity” and noting that “there 
is nothing objectionable about a city passing a general ordinance to ban public nudity and 
at the same time recognizing that one specific occurrence of public nudity—nude erotic 
dancing—is particularly problematic because it produces harmful secondary effects”).  
 93.  475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 94.  Id. at 46, 48 (noting that “the resolution of this case is largely dictated by our deci-
sion in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,” and that “the Renton ordinance is completely 
consistent with our definition of ‘content-neutral’ speech regulations as those that ‘are jus-
tified without reference to the content of the regulated speech’” (citations omitted)). 
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content-neutral instead of content-based.95  Three years later, in Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism,96 the Supreme Court invoked Renton and clari-
fied that “[t]he government’s purpose is the controlling considera-
tion” in any content-related analysis.97 
While the Supreme Court has upheld as content neutral laws 
supported by purely content-free justifications,98 the Court has also 
upheld as content neutral laws with relatively clear message-related 
justifications.99  This is particularly evident in the context of anti-
abortion protests.  For example, in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 
Inc.,100 the Court emphasized concerns with patient privacy and psy-
chological well-being in “hold[ing] that the establishment of a 36-foot 
buffer zone on a public street [outside of an abortion clinic] from 
which [anti-abortion] demonstrators [we]re excluded” was constitu-
tional under the First Amendment.101  Three years after Madsen, in 
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York,102 the Court concluded 
that the governmental interest in “protecting a woman’s freedom to 
seek pregnancy-related services . . . justif[ied] an appropriately tai-
lored injunction to secure unimpeded physical access to [abortion] 
clinics;”103 the Court’s conclusion conflicted with the protesters’ claim 
that the injunction was based purely on “disagreement with the mes-
sage being conveyed,” in part because “the condition on the [counse-
lors’] freedom to espouse [their views] within the buffer zone [was in 
fact] the result of their own previous harassment and intimidation of 
patients.”104 
Although it is difficult to deduce a bright-line rule from the Su-
preme Court’s content-related speech jurisprudence, it remains un-
                                                        
 95.  Id. at 43, 48. 
 96.  491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 97.  Id. at 791–92 (“A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of ex-
pression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messag-
es but not others.” (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48)). 
 98.  See, e.g., id. at 792 (upholding a municipal noise regulation as content-neutral be-
cause “the principal justification for the sound-amplification guideline is the city’s desire 
to control noise levels . . . and to avoid undue intrusion into residential areas and other 
areas of the park”). 
 99.  Cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) (acknowledging a neutral interest in 
“unimpeded access to health care facilities” and an arguably content-related interest in 
“the avoidance of potential trauma to patients associated with confrontational protests”). 
 100.  512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 101.  Id. at 757, 768 (observing that the state had a “strong interest in residential priva-
cy . . . applied by analogy to medical privacy” and in protecting “not only the psychological, 
but also the physical, well-being of the patient held ‘captive’ by medical circumstance” (ci-
tations omitted)). 
 102.  519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
 103.  Id. at 376. 
 104.  Id. at 384–85. 
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disputed that certain categories of speech do not receive First 
Amendment protection.  This category includes speech involving ob-
scene materials,105 and speech likely to incite immediate violence and 
cause injury.106  Regarding obscenity, the Supreme Court in Miller v. 
California107 established more concrete standards for judging whether 
material should be regarded as obscene, and thus not constitutionally 
protected.  Under the Miller framework: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) wheth-
er the “average person, applying contemporary community 
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, ap-
peals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts 
or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct . . . ; 
and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious lit-
erary, artistic, political, or scientific value.108 
Obscenity occupies a particularly limited category of speech, the 
restriction of which has very rarely triggered a constitutional problem.  
Otherwise, as the Supreme Court has noted, “[a]ll ideas having even 
the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, con-
troversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opin-
ion—have the full protection of the guarantees.”109 
B.  The Content-Based Versus Content-Neutral Distinction Has Important 
Implications for Anti-Abortion Protests 
Anti-abortion protests implicate the important distinction be-
tween content-neutral and content-based restrictions on speech.  The 
analysis in this area is somewhat muddied because the emotionally 
charged nature of certain speech, including anti-abortion protests, 
                                                        
 105.  See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479 n.1, 492 (1957) (upholding a fed-
eral statute criminalizing the mailing of any “obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, 
pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent charac-
ter” against a First Amendment challenge); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 
(1982) (recognizing that child pornography constitutes another category receiving less 
than full constitutional protection under the First Amendment); Paris Adult Theatre I v. 
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (reasoning that “the States have the power to make a moral-
ly neutral judgment that public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such ma-
terial, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole”).   
 106.  See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“There are cer-
tain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment 
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  These include 
the . . . insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or 
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 107.  413 U.S. 15 (1973), abrogation recognized by State v. Claiborne, 818 P.2d 285, 289 
(Idaho 1991). 
 108.  Id. at 24. 
 109.  Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. 
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makes it difficult to escape restrictions motivated by content.  Con-
tent-neutral restrictions do, however, exist and have typically included 
justified public nuisance regulations.  In Kovacs v. Cooper,110 for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance from Trenton, New 
Jersey that prohibited trucks and other instruments from emitting 
“loud and raucous noises,” reasoning that the regulation was ad-
dressed to the “comfort and convenience” of citizens.111  In the anti-
abortion protest context, other courts have likewise characterized re-
strictions targeted at protecting listeners from loud and unwelcome 
noise as content-neutral.112 
Additionally, while TPM restrictions fall squarely into the catego-
ry of content-neutral regulations,113 the inclusion of certain forms of 
symbolic speech in this category has sown further confusion sur-
rounding the proper test courts should apply when distinguishing be-
tween “symbolic speech” and “pure speech.”114  Nevertheless, content-
neural regulations of speech must still be justified by reference to the 
traditional TPM test, to a reformulated version, or to a combination 
thereof.  In United States v. O’Brien,115 the Supreme Court upheld 
O’Brien’s conviction for burning his draft card as a form of protest 
against the Vietnam War, articulating a four-part variation of the tra-
ditional TPM test.116 
                                                        
 110.  336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
 111.  Id. at 86, 88; see also id. at 88 (“The preferred position of freedom of speech in a 
society that cherishes liberty for all does not require legislators to be insensible to claims 
by citizens to comfort and convenience.  To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the 
rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself.”).   
 112.  See, e.g., Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 440–42, 453–54, 569 A.2d 604, 606, 612 
(1990) (upholding the application of a Maryland statute prohibiting willful disturbance of 
neighborhoods “when used by the State to limit the volume of speech” of an anti-abortion 
protester against a First Amendment challenge on the grounds that “the statute [went] no 
further than to afford content-neutral protection to the captive auditor . . . who cannot 
avoid continuing, unreasonably loud and disruptive communications emanating from the 
street”). 
 113.  See supra text accompanying notes 72–78. 
 114.  See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) (emphasizing that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments do not provide “the same kind of freedom to those who would 
communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and 
highways as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech”); 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“The government generally has a freer hand 
in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting written or spoken word.”). 
 115.  391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 116.  Id. at 369, 372.  The four-part test from O’Brien for determining whether a gov-
ernment regulation in the symbolic speech context is constitutional states:  
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [(1)] if it is within the consti-
tutional power of the Government; [(2)] if it furthers an important or substan-
tial governmental interest; [(3)] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and [(4)] if the incidental restriction on alleged 
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Then, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court outlined the fol-
lowing standard for determining the constitutionality of TPM re-
strictions: “a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected 
speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legiti-
mate, content-neutral interests but it need not be the least restrictive 
or least intrusive means of doing so.”117  It remains unclear whether 
the four-part formulation from O’Brien is more or less restrictive than 
the TPM test articulated in Ward. 
Compounding the confusion stemming from the Supreme 
Court’s adoption of varying formulations of the TPM test, the Court 
in Madsen appears to have created a TPM test specifically tailored to 
abortion cases—this test requires that the restriction on speech “bur-
den no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government in-
terest.”118  Justice Scalia opined in his dissent in Madsen that the dif-
ference between the old standard and the new standard was subtle yet 
profound, labeling the new test “intermediate-intermediate scruti-
ny.”119 
The anti-abortion protest context provides a unique forum for 
judicial interpretation of content-based and content-neutral re-
strictions on speech.  Restrictions on anti-abortion protest speech 
have in large part been justified as content neutral on the basis of 
secondary effects.  In Medlin v. Palmer,120 for example, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the constitutional-
ity of an ordinance that prohibited the use of loudspeakers within a 
certain range of any school in session, single-family or multiple family 
dwellings, hospitals, or other medical facilities providing outpatient 
services.121  In considering anti-abortion activists’ First Amendment 
                                                        
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of 
that interest.  
Id. at 377. 
 117.  491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). 
 118.  Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (emphasis added).  
The Madsen Court reinforced the notion that “when evaluating a content-neutral injunc-
tion, we think that our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigor-
ous.”  Id. at 765.  Madsen involved a constitutional challenge to a multi-faceted injunction 
prohibiting anti-abortion protestors from “demonstrating in certain places and in various 
ways outside of a health clinic that performs abortions.”  Id. at 757.   
 119.  See id. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(“The Court . . . creates, brand new for this abortion-related case, an additional standard that is 
(supposedly) ‘somewhat more stringent,’ than intermediate scrutiny, yet not as ‘rigorous,’ 
as strict scrutiny. . . .  [P]erhaps we could call it intermediate-intermediate scrutiny.  The 
difference between it and intermediate scrutiny . . . is frankly too subtle for me to de-
scribe . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 120.  874 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 121.  Id. at 1086, 1092.   
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challenge to the ordinance, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the ordi-
nance was specifically tailored “to protect people suffering from ill 
health, the aged, and school children from the nuisance of loud-
speaker noise” in spite of the message conveyed.122  Furthermore, in 
Portland Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Advocates for Life,123 the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitu-
tionality of a preliminary injunction, with certain modifications, that 
regulated anti-abortion protests outside of a women’s health center 
that provided abortions.124  The court reasoned that the ordinance 
was content-neutral because it did not specifically target the views es-
poused by the demonstrators, but rather protected the clinic from 
physical intimidation and noise.125  Courts have thus recognized that, 
in the anti-abortion protest context, there is a special need to careful-
ly balance the protester’s right to free speech with the public’s desire 
to be free from unwanted invasions of personal privacy and safety. 
C.  The Supreme Court Recognizes Discrete Categories of Government 
Interests That Support Restricting Otherwise Constitutionally 
Protected Speech 
The Supreme Court has recognized certain government interests 
that justify restricting speech that would otherwise be protected by the 
First Amendment.  These interests include, among others, protecting 
residential privacy,126 protecting normal school activity,127 and regulat-
ing the use of public streets for the protection of personal safety.128  
                                                        
 122.  Id. at 1090; see also, e.g., id. (“The ordinance makes no reference whatsoever to the 
content of speech . . . .”).   
 123.  859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 124.  Id. at 683–84, 686–87. 
 125.  Id. at 686. 
 126.  See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483, 486 (1988) (concluding that an ordinance 
that prohibited “focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular residence” 
was constitutional on the grounds that the picketers’ “activity nonetheless inherently and 
offensively intrudes on residential privacy[ because t]he devastating effect of targeted 
picketing on the quiet enjoyment of the home is beyond doubt”). 
 127.  See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 120 (1972) (upholding an “anti-
noise ordinance” that prohibited willfully disturbing school sessions while on grounds ad-
jacent to a school, reasoning that the “ordinance imposes no such restriction on expressive 
activity before or after the school session, while the student/faculty ‘audience’ enters and 
leaves the school”).   
 128.  See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (“The authority of a munici-
pality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in 
the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but 
rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order . . . .”); Schneider v. New Jersey, 
308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (explaining that “[m]unicipal authorities . . . have the duty to 
keep their communities’ streets open and available for movement of people and property” 
and that “[s]o long as legislation . . . does not abridge the constitutional liberty of one 
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Regulating anti-abortion protests raises similarly important interests.  
Abortion clinics are hotspots for anti-abortion protests, and courts 
have thus articulated two important governmental interests operating 
within this framework: (1) the interest in keeping streets and side-
walks free from obstruction129 and (2) the interest in prohibiting con-
duct that disrupts the provision of medical care.130  In Part II.D, this 
Note addresses how Roe, Casey and Gonzales have permitted increased 
state interference with a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnan-
cy on the basis of two additional government interests: (1) protecting 
the potentiality of human life, and (2) protecting the pregnant wom-
an’s health.131 
Under Ward, to restrict expressive speech that would otherwise 
be constitutionally protected, the restriction (1) must be “narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest” and (2) must 
“leave open ample alternative means for communication of the in-
formation.”132  According to the Supreme Court, “[a] statute is nar-
rowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact 
source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.”133  To pass muster under 
O’Brien, however, “an incidental burden on speech [must be] no 
greater than is essential” and “the neutral regulation [must] pro-
                                                        
rightfully upon the street to impart information through speech or the distribution of lit-
erature, [the State] may lawfully regulate the conduct of those using the streets.”); see also 
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968) (upholding the constitutionality of a Missis-
sippi statute that prohibited picketing insofar as the picketing “‘unreasonably interfere[d] 
with free ingress or egress to or from any public premises[, including] courthouses’” and 
also “‘unreasonably interfere[d] with free use of public streets’”). 
 129.  See, e.g., N.Y. State Nat’l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1343 (2d Cir. 
1989) (describing the protesters who attempted to block “ingress and egress” to the abor-
tion clinics as “trespassers without right, constitutional or otherwise, to be there” and rea-
soning that, “[i]nsofar as appellants’ rights of free speech were exercised in close proximi-
ty to individual women entering or leaving the clinics so as to tortiously assault or harass 
them, appellants’ rights ended where those women’s rights began”). 
 130.  See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 708–09, 719–20 (2000) (reasoning that 
Colorado’s interest in protecting women’s privacy and ensuring meaningful access to abor-
tion clinics  “[we]re unrelated to the content of the demonstrators’ speech”); see also Am. 
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 613 F. Supp. 656, 666 (E.D. Pa. 
1985) (explaining that verbal harassment of women entering and leaving abortion clinics 
results in increased anxiety for these women, which could in turn impact the women’s 
abortion decision as well as the safety and efficacy of the procedure). 
 131.  See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 767–68 (1994) (ac-
knowledging “that the State has a strong interest in protecting a woman’s freedom to seek 
lawful medical or counseling services in connection with her pregnancy”).   
 132.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 133.  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (citation omitted). 
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mote[] a substantial government interest that would be achieved less 
effectively absent the regulation.”134 
Despite the permissibility of restrictions on speech, “[t]he First 
Amendment protects the right of every citizen to ‘reach the minds of 
willing listeners.’”135  As the Court has acknowledged, “‘to do so there 
must be opportunity to win [willing listeners’] attention.’”136  In the 
anti-abortion protest context, however, protesters may not effectively 
block all access to abortion clinics as a form of protest, for such an 
overt action would impede the delivery of basic and essential medical 
services.137  Still, courts have struck down restrictions on anti-abortion 
protest speech on the grounds that the ordinance or statute at issue 
prohibited any and all means by which the protesters could reasona-
bly reach their target audience.138 
D.  Roe, Casey, and Gonzales Permit State Interference into a Woman’s 
Right to Terminate Her Pregnancy in the Name of Maternal Health 
and Potential Life 
In the aftermath of Roe v. Wade,139 the Supreme Court gradually 
redefined a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.  In Roe, the 
Supreme Court defined a woman’s decision to terminate her preg-
nancy as a fundamental right.140  The Court went on to note that gov-
                                                        
 134.  See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687–89 (1985) (discussing O’Brien and 
its progeny).   
 135.  Heffron v. Int’l  Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) 
(quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949)). 
 136.  Id. (quoting Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87). 
 137.  See Bering v. Share, 721 P.2d 918, 930 (Wash. 1986) (“In the absence of a place 
restriction, women visiting the clinic for abortion-related services would be forced to walk 
a gauntlet of placard-carrying anti-abortionists.”). 
 138.  See, e.g., Chico Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Scully, 256 Cal. Rptr. 194, 235–36, 
246 (Cal. Ct. App., 3d Dist. 1989) (affirming the lower court’s decision to deny the Wom-
en’s Health Center injunctive relief excluding anti-abortion protesters “from ‘any vantage 
point from which clients entering the [clinic] can be identified’ on Saturdays when abor-
tions are performed” on the grounds that “ample alternative channels of communication 
do not exist if a speaker’s target audience is altogether insulated from the speaker’s mes-
sage[, which] is the case here[ because t]he Center performs abortions only on Satur-
days”).  In Scully, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District reasoned 
that, by excluding the protesters from demonstrating on the only day when abortions were 
performed, the health center effectively cut off any and all alternative means by which the 
protest organization could reach its intended audience.  See id. at 246 (“The Center made 
no showing that Defendants had any means of reaching their target audience—women 
obtaining abortions—if Defendants were excluded from the vicinity of the Center on Sat-
urdays.”). 
 139.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 140.  See id. at 152–53 (observing “that only personal rights that can be deemed ‘funda-
mental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ are included in this guarantee of 
personal privacy” and determining that “[t]his right of privacy . . . is broad enough to en-
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ernment interference with this fundamental right “may be justified 
only by ‘a compelling state interest’ and that legislative enactments 
must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests 
at stake.”141  The Court noted that a fetus is not a “person” within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, concluding that a “fetus’s 
right to life” is not guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.142  The Roe 
Court confirmed, however, that the State has two important and legit-
imate interests at stake in the abortion context—(1) “protecting the 
potentiality of human life” and (2) “preserving and protecting the 
health of the pregnant woman”—that become “compelling” at a cer-
tain point during a woman’s pregnancy.143  Regarding the state’s in-
terest in protecting “potential life,” the Court emphasized that “the 
‘compelling’ point is at viability . . . because the fetus then presumably 
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”144  
Regarding the state’s interest in protecting “the health of the moth-
er,” the Court concluded that “the ‘compelling point’ . . . is at the end 
of the first trimester . . . because of the now-established medical fact 
that . . . until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may 
be less than mortality in normal childbirth.”145  The Supreme Court 
established a trimester framework to explain the tangible points at 
which the state interests became compelling and to justify state inter-
vention into a woman’s otherwise fundamental right to terminate her 
pregnancy.146 
                                                        
compass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 141.  Id. at 155–56 (citations omitted). 
 142.  Id. at 157 (noting that “[t]he Constitution does not define ‘person’ in so many 
words . . . [b]ut [that] in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has 
application only postnatally” and affirmatively concluding that “the word ‘person,’ as used 
in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn” (footnote omitted)). 
 143.  Id. at 162–63.   
 144.  Id. at 163. 
 145.  Id.  
 146.  The Court’s trimester framework included the following distinct stages:  
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abor-
tion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the 
pregnant woman’s attending physician. 
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the 
State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, 
regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal 
health. 
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the 
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abor-
tion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the 
preservation of the life or health of the mother. 
Id. at 164–65. 
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Nearly twenty years later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,147 the Supreme Court once again addressed a 
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.  The Casey Court reaf-
firmed the three core principles established in Roe,148 while a plurality 
of the Court modified other portions of the Roe opinion, specifically 
the trimester framework.149  The Casey plurality abandoned Roe’s tri-
mester framework and instead embraced the undue burden standard 
for determining the permissibility of regulating a woman’s right to 
terminate her pregnancy.150  In doing so, the plurality also vested 
states with greater power to regulate that right.151  In sum, a plurality 
of the Court determined that four of the five provisions of the Penn-
sylvania law at issue—informed consent, a twenty-four hour waiting 
period, parental notification, and recordkeeping and reporting re-
quirements—were constitutional because they did not impose an un-
due burden on a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy pre-
viability.152 
                                                        
 147.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 148.  Id. at 845–46 (recognizing the following three principles: (1) a woman’s right to 
have an abortion pre-viability absent interference from the state; (2) the state’s power to 
restrict abortions post-viability; and (3) the state’s legitimate interest in protecting the 
health of the woman and the life of the fetus “from the outset of the pregnancy”). 
 149.  See id. at 872 (“The trimester framework no doubt was erected to ensure that the 
woman’s right to choose not become so subordinate to the State’s interest in promoting 
fetal life that her choice exists in theory but not in fact.  We do not agree, however, that 
the trimester approach is necessary to accomplish this objective.  A framework of this rigid-
ity was unnecessary.”).  
 150.  Id. at 874 (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s 
ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause.”). 
 151.  Id. at 871, 876 (acknowledging that cases decided after Roe concluded “that any 
regulation touching upon the abortion decision must survive strict scrutiny, to be sus-
tained only if drawn in narrow terms to further a compelling state interest,” but instead 
reasoning that “[t]he very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life 
leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted,” thus mak-
ing “the undue burden standard . . . the appropriate means of reconciling the State’s in-
terest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty”).  
 152.  Id. at 881–88, 899–901; see also Rachel Rebouché, Comparative Pragmatism, 72 MD. 
L. REV. 85, 95 & nn. 51–54 (2012) (“[T]he plurality upheld Pennsylvania’s requirements 
for parental consent for a minor’s abortion, record keeping and reporting to the state, in-
formed consent, and a twenty-four-hour waiting period.” (footnotes omitted)).  A majority 
of the Court, however, struck down the spousal notification requirement as imposing an 
undue burden on a woman’s right to access an abortion.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 889–98 
(“Women do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they marry.  The Con-
stitution protects all individuals, male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse of 
governmental power . . . .  These considerations confirm our conclusion that [the spousal 
notification requirement] is invalid.”).   
The plurality emphasized that, although a woman has a right to terminate her preg-
nancy pre-viability, the state is not entirely prohibited from taking steps to ensure that the 
woman’s choice is adequately informed.  Id. at 872.  For example, the plurality noted that 
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In Gonzales v. Carhart,153 the third case in the trio of abortion cas-
es, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.154  In a majority opinion written by 
Justice Kennedy, the Court rejected a facial challenge to a federal 
statute banning pre-viability partial birth abortions, known in the 
medical community as intact dilation and evacuation (“intact D & E”), 
dilation and extraction (“D & X”), and intact dilation and extraction 
(“intact D & X”).155  As Justice Kennedy reasoned, “[w]here it has a ra-
tional basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State 
may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures and substitute 
others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the 
medical profession in order to promote respect for life.”156  In dissent, 
Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court’s opinion was “alarming” be-
cause it not only “tolerates, indeed applauds, federal intervention to 
ban nationwide a procedure found necessary and proper in certain 
cases,” but it also “blurs the line, firmly drawn in Casey between previ-
ability and postviability abortions.”157  Since Roe, as the trio of abortion 
cases suggests, the Supreme Court has permitted increased state in-
trusion into a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy. 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Lefemine v. Wideman, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the District 
of South Carolina that law enforcement officers, who demanded that 
anti-abortion protesters remove their graphic signs while conducting 
an anti-abortion demonstration, were entitled to qualified immuni-
ty.158  Because neither party challenged whether the defendants’ ac-
tions amounted to a content-based restriction on the protestors’ 
speech, the Fourth Circuit presumed that the defendants’ actions 
were unconstitutional under the First Amendment.159  On appeal, 
plaintiff Steven Lefemine “contend[ed] that the district court (1) 
                                                        
even in the preliminary stages of a pregnancy, “the State may enact rules and regulations 
designed to encourage [the woman] to know that there are philosophic and social argu-
ments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to 
full term.”  Id.  
 153.  550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 154.  218 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006). 
 155.  Id. at 136, 167–68 (“Respondents have not demonstrated that the Act, as a facial 
matter, is void for vagueness, or that it imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to 
abortion based on its overbreadth or lack of a health exception.”).  
 156.  Id. at 158. 
 157.  Id. at 170–71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 158.  672 F.3d 292, 295 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 9 (2012). 
 159.  Id. at 297. 
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erred in granting Defendants qualified immunity” and abused its dis-
cretion by (2) “failing to rule on Plaintiff’s request for declaratory re-
lief” and (3) “failing to award Plaintiff attorney’s fees.”160  Defendants’ 
sole argument on appeal was that the district court erred in granting 
injunctive relief against named defendant Chief Deputy Mike Freder-
ick because he “[wa]s no longer employed by the Greenwood County 
Sheriff’s Office.”161  The Fourth Circuit’s decision can be broken 
down into four parts. 
First, the Fourth Circuit began by addressing Lefemine’s argu-
ment that the district court erred in granting the defendants qualified 
immunity.162  Lefemine argued that the officers violated a “clearly es-
tablished right” under the First Amendment and that any “reasonable 
officer[] should have known that [his] actions violated that right.”163  
In response, the court noted that “[t]he doctrine of qualified immun-
ity ‘protects government officials from liability for civil damages inso-
far as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.’”164 The court relied on the Supreme Court’s two-prong bal-
ancing test for determining whether the state is entitled to qualified 
immunity.165  In determining whether a right was clearly established at 
the time of its alleged infringement, the Fourth Circuit concluded 
that the right must be defined “‘in light of the specific context of the 
case, not as a broad general proposition.’”166 
Still addressing qualified immunity, the Fourth Circuit then 
turned to Lefemine’s assertion that the right should be considered in 
light of the “heckler’s veto.”167  The court rejected Lefemine’s argu-
ment, reasoning that such a broad construction would undoubtedly 
upset the “interest-balancing” underpinning any qualified immunity 
                                                        
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 303. 
 162.  Id. at 297–301. 
 163.  Id. at 297. 
 164.  Id. at 297–98 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). 
 165.  Id. at 298.  Quoting the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit observed that 
“‘[q]ualified immunity balances two important interests—[(1)] the need to hold public 
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and [(2)] the need to shield 
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reason-
ably.’”  Id. (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231).   
 166.  Id. (quoting McKinney v. Richland Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 431 F.3d 415, 417 (4th 
Cir. 2005)). 
 167.  Id. at 299.  The Fourth Circuit has characterized the heckler’s veto as “‘the success-
ful importuning of government to curtail offensive speech at peril of suffering disruptions 
of public order.’”  Id. at 299 n.3 (quoting Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir. 
1985)). 
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analysis.168  The court noted that while a clearly established right to be 
free from certain restrictions on expression exists, the right to free 
speech does not translate into a right to express any opinion or belief 
at any public place at any time.169  The court acknowledged, however, 
that any content-based restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest.170  Instead, the Fourth Circuit 
framed the issue as whether “it was clearly established that law en-
forcement officers could not proscribe the display of large, graphic 
photographs in a traditional public forum.”171 
The Fourth Circuit noted that, at the time when the incident oc-
curred in 2005, precedent within both the Fourth Circuit and the Su-
preme Court was unclear on this precise issue—namely, whether ask-
ing protesters in a public forum to remove “large, graphic” signs 
constituted a proscribed infringement of First Amendment rights.172  
The court pointed out that “there was no clear holding concerning 
whether such restrictions might be deemed content-based or content-
neutral,” which was “a sometimes difficult and thorny question.”173  
The Fourth Circuit did acknowledge, however, that the Supreme 
Court has issued at least one opinion suggesting that certain re-
strictions on anti-abortion protest demonstrations may be deemed 
content-neutral.174 
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment to the defendants in their individual capacities 
on qualified immunity grounds.175  The court clarified its decision by 
emphasizing that the “Defendants believed they were acting in a con-
tent-neutral manner to safeguard legitimate, compelling government 
interests.”176  To bolster its analysis, the court proffered two inde-
                                                        
 168.  Id. at 299. 
 169.  Id. at 299 n.4 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965)).  The Fourth Cir-
cuit acknowledged that the government is permitted to enforce and protect safety on pub-
lic streets.  Id. (citing Cox, 379 U.S. at 554–55).  
 170.  Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983)). 
 171.  Id. at 299. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id.  The Fourth Circuit observed that by 2005, at least two other circuit courts of 
appeals “had found similar restrictions on large, graphic signs in heavily trafficked areas to 
be content-neutral, not content-based.”  Id. at 300 n.6 (citing Frye v. Kan. City Mo. Police 
Dep’t, 375 F.3d 785, 791–92 (8th Cir. 2004); Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 641–
42 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 174.  See id. at 300 (“‘But the protection afforded to offensive messages does not always 
embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it.  
Indeed, it may not be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate verbal or visual assault, 
that justifies proscription.’” (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000))). 
 175.  Id. at 301. 
 176.  Id. 
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pendent justifications for the defendants’ actions “even if [the court 
accepts as true that the] Defendants should have been aware that they 
were engaging in content-based restrictions, subject to strict scruti-
ny.”177  The Fourth Circuit concluded that, given the state of the law in 
2005, it was not objectively unreasonable for defendants to believe 
they could permit the continued protest and remove the graphic signs 
both to protect the public from foreseeable traffic hazards and to pro-
tect minors from seeing the images.178 
The second part of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion addressed 
Lefemine’s “argume[nt] that the district court abused its discretion by 
failing to rule on [his] request for declaratory relief.”179  Noting that 
Lefemine was “awarded summary judgment on [his] request for a de-
claratory judgment that [the] Defendants’ actions were an unconsti-
tutional infringement on [his] First Amendment rights,” the Fourth 
Circuit could “discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 
decision not to make the declaratory judgment more explicit.”180 
Third, the Fourth Circuit addressed Lefemine’s “argume[nt] that 
the district court abused its discretion by failing to award [him] attor-
ney’s fees.”181  As the prevailing party, Lefemine argued he should 
“‘recover attorney’s fees unless special circumstances would render 
[the fee] award unjust.’”182  The Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme 
Court’s definition of “prevailing party” to conduct its abuse-of-
discretion analysis.183  Specifically, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged 
that “‘to be considered a prevailing party . . . the plaintiff must be able 
to’” highlight a change in “‘the legal relationship between itself and 
                                                        
 177.  See id. at 300 (describing the state’s “‘substantial and legitimate interest in traffic 
safety’” and its “‘compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-
being of minors’” (citations omitted)). 
 178.  Id. at 300–01.  The court observed that the case record supported this proposition, 
as Chief Deputy Frederick had testified in his deposition that he was particularly con-
cerned with “‘the combination of [the signs’] graphic nature and their proximity to the 
roadway.’”  Id. at 301 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 179.  Id. at 301–02. 
 180.  Id.  Specifically, the court observed: “The injunction issued by the district court 
did not follow the language employed by Lefemine in its motion for summary judgment, 
while the opinion and order concludes that Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were violat-
ed by [the] Defendants’ actions.”  Id. at 302. 
 181.  Id. at 302–03. 
 182.  Id. at 302 (quoting People Helpers Fund, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 12 F.3d 1321, 
1327 (4th Cir. 1993)).   
 183.  Id. at 302–03.  According to Supreme Court precedent, “‘plaintiffs may be consid-
ered prevailing parties for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue 
in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit.’”  
Id. at 302 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 
789 (1989)). 
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the defendant.’”184  The court concluded “that a judicial determina-
tion that a plaintiff’s civil rights had been violated, without more, was 
insufficient” to qualify the plaintiff as a prevailing party entitled to at-
torney’s fees.185  The Fourth Circuit ultimately affirmed the denial of 
attorney’s fees to Lefemine, concluding that the outcome of the litiga-
tion “‘ha[d] not altered the relative positions of the parties’” on two 
grounds—(1) there was limited support for the proposition that 
Lefemine was a prevailing party and (2) there were no other damages 
awards.186 
The final part of the Fourth Circuit’s decision addressed the de-
fendants’ two interwoven contentions for cross-appeal.187  First, the de-
fendants argued that “the district court erred in granting injunctive 
relief against Chief Deputy Frederick, who [wa]s no longer employed 
by the Greenwood County Sheriff’s Office.”188  Second, the defendants 
argued that “the award of injunctive relief against each of them in 
their individual capacities” should be dismissed as duplicative and 
that “injunctive relief against them in their official capacities” should 
also be dismissed.189  In dismissing the defendants’ individual and of-
ficial capacities contentions, the court concluded that “[c]laims 
for . . . injunctive relief are not affected by qualified immunity.”190  
Regarding the contention about former Chief Deputy Frederick, the 
court reasoned that “injunctive relief against a state officer in his offi-
cial capacity may be appropriate if ‘the complaint alleges an ongoing 
violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as pro-
                                                        
 184.  Id. (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 792). 
 185.  Id. (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 763 (1987)). 
 186.  Id. at 303 (quoting People Helpers Fund, Inc., 12 F.3d at 1329).  The Supreme Court 
granted Lefemine’s petition for a writ of certiorari “to review the Fourth Circuit’s deter-
mination that he was not a prevailing party.”  Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 S. Ct. 9, 11 
(2012).  Disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that 
Lefemine was a “prevailing party” because the legal relationship between the parties was 
materially altered—“Before the ruling, the police intended to stop Lefemine from protest-
ing with his signs; after the ruling, the police could not prevent him from demonstrating 
in that manner.  So when the District Court ‘ordered [d]efendants to comply with the 
law,’ the relief given . . . supported the award of attorney’s fees.”  Id. (internal citation 
omitted).  The Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further 
proceedings to determine whether any “special circumstances” existed that would render 
an award of attorney’s fees unjust.  Id. at 11–12. 
 187.  Lefemine, 672 F.3d. at 303–04. 
 188.  Id. at 303. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. (citing Roller v. Cavanaugh, 984 F.3d 120, 122 (4th Cir. 1993)); see also id. 
(“The district court appears to have been analyzing whether Defendants might be liable 
for damages, not whether they could be subject to an injunction in either their official or 
individual capacities.”). 
  
1404 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1378 
spective.’”191  The court noted that even though Chief Deputy Freder-
ick’s employment with the Greenwood County Sheriff’s Office may 
have ceased, there remained a “‘cognizable danger of recurrent viola-
tion’” because he was “still a police officer, albeit elsewhere, in the 
state of South Carolina.”192  Having found “no abuse of discretion in 
the district court’s decision to order [the] Defendants to . . . refrain 
from impermissible content-based restrictions,” the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s grant of injunctive relief against the de-
fendants.193 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Lefemine v. Wideman, the Fourth Circuit issued a four-part 
holding, in which it determined that the defendant law enforcement 
officers “were entitled to qualified immunity from suit in their indi-
vidual capacities” for violations of Lefemine’s First Amendment rights 
on the grounds that “the specific rights at issue were not clearly estab-
lished at the time of the violations.”194  Neither party addressed the vi-
olation of Lefemine’s First Amendment rights on appeal,195 but the 
Fourth Circuit nonetheless relied on an ambiguous body of case law 
regarding the distinction between content-based and content-neutral 
restrictions on speech in its qualified immunity analysis.196  This con-
fusion suggests that restrictions on constitutionally protected speech 
in the anti-abortion protest context are not amenable to the standard 
content-based versus content-neutral analysis—there appears to be no 
conceptual space for content-neutral regulations due to the emotion-
ally charged nature of anti-abortion protests.197  Because the content-
based versus content-neutral distinction sows judicial confusion over 
the constitutionality of restrictions on anti-abortion protest speech, 
courts should eliminate this initial inquiry and apply a single strict 
                                                        
 191.  Id. at 304 (citing Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 
(2002)). 
 192.  Id. (quoting United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).   
 193.  Id.; see also id. (“In sum, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
to [the] Defendants on grounds of qualified immunity, the denial of an award of attor-
ney’s fees to Lefemine, and the grant of injunctive relief to Lefemine against [the] De-
fendants.”). 
 194.  Id. at 295, 301.  For a detailed explanation of the Fourth Circuit’s decision, see 
supra Part III. 
 195.  See supra text accompanying notes 54, 159. 
 196.  See infra Part IV.A.  Part IV.A similarly discusses the district court’s improper reli-
ance upon ambiguous jurisprudence concerning the distinction between content-based 
versus content-neutral restrictions on speech. 
 197.  See infra Part IV.B 
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scrutiny standard to all government regulations targeted at these 
forms of speech.198   
In addition, the proper analytical strategy for framing First 
Amendment violations in the context of anti-abortion protests neces-
sitates calling upon Roe, Casey, and Gonzales,199 in which the Court has 
permitted increased government interference into a woman’s personal 
decision to terminate her pregnancy.200  This shift in the Court’s abor-
tion jurisprudence should influence future Supreme Court decisions 
addressing the constitutionality of government infringement on pro-
tected speech in this limited context.  In light of the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of the state’s legitimate interests in preserving maternal 
health and potential human life, then, anti-abortion protesters’ First 
Amendment rights must be given heightened recognition and protec-
tion under the U.S. Constitution.201 
A.  The District Court and Fourth Circuit in Lefemine Relied on 
Ambiguous Precedent Governing the Content-Neutral Versus Content-
Based Distinction for Constitutional Restrictions on First Amendment 
Speech 
Relying on doctrinally “ambiguous” case law from the Fourth 
Circuit and the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit in Lefemine rea-
soned that when the incident occurred between Lefemine and the de-
fendants in 2005, there was no consistent and clear holding that ad-
dressed “whether asking demonstrators to remove [graphic anti-
abortion protest signs] would be an impermissible infringement of 
their First Amendment rights.”202  The court even acknowledged that 
deciding whether such restrictions were content-based or content-
neutral was a “thorny question.”203  The court cited Hill v. Colorado,204 a 
Supreme Court case upholding the constitutionality of a “Colorado 
statute that regulate[d] speech-related conduct within 100 feet of the 
entrance to any health care facility,”205 as an analogous case.206  In-
deed, the Fourth Circuit construed Hill as standing for the proposi-
                                                        
 198.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 199.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 200.  See supra Part II.D.  
 201.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 202.  Lefemine v. Wideman, 672 F.3d 292, 299 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 
133 S. Ct. 9 (2012).   
 203.  Id.  
 204.  530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
 205.  Id. at 707, 714. 
 206.  See Lefemine, 672 F.3d at 300 (discussing Hill, which suggested that restrictions on 
anti-abortion protest speech “might . . . be content-neutral” (citing Hill, 530 U.S. at 716)). 
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tion “that certain restrictions, even if made in response to the graphic and 
offensive nature of images to the viewer, might still be deemed content-
neutral.”207 
The Supreme Court has noted that the proper inquiry for “de-
termining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has 
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the mes-
sage it conveys.”208  As Hill suggested, however, when determining the 
“‘content neutrality’” of a statute, “[i]t is common in the law to exam-
ine the content of a communication to determine the speaker’s pur-
pose.”209  In addition, when balancing the right of protesters “to at-
tempt to persuade others to change their views” against the right of 
listeners to have “free passage in going to and from . . . a medical fa-
cility,” the Hill Court specifically stressed the public’s “interest in 
avoiding unwanted communication.”210  In response, Justice Kennedy 
noted in his dissenting opinion that as a result of the Court’s ruling in 
Hill, “we learn today that citizens have a right to avoid unpopular 
speech in a public forum.”211  As Justice Kennedy suggested, by legiti-
mating the unwilling audience—an argument upon which the Fourth 
Circuit similarly relied in Lefemine212—the Hill Court appears to have 
carved out a judicial caveat to what otherwise would have presumably 
been a content-based restriction on protected speech.213 
In Lefemine, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that, “even if [the] De-
fendants should have been aware that they were engaging in content-
based restrictions, subject to strict scrutiny,” the state may otherwise 
be justified in restricting such speech through exercise of its police 
powers.214  As the Supreme Court established in Ward, however, the 
                                                        
 207.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 208.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (emphasis added).  
 209.  530 U.S. at 719–21.  But see id. (“With respect to the conduct that is the focus of 
the Colorado statute, it is unlikely that there would often be any need to know exactly what 
words were spoken in order to determine whether ‘sidewalk counselors’ are engaging in 
‘oral protest, education, or counseling’ rather than pure social or random conversation.”).   
 210.  Id. at 715–17. 
 211.  Id. at 771 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 212.  See Lefemine, 672 F.3d at 300 (discussing “‘speech that is so intrusive that the unwill-
ing audience cannot avoid it’” (quoting Hill, 530 U.S. at 716)).  
 213.  See, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to 
Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1353 (2006) (“[T]he va-
garies inherent in characterizing speech regulations as content-based versus content-
neutral have resulted in standards for distinguishing between them that are applied in an 
inconsistent and results-driven manner by the Court.”); see also id. at 1405 (“Imagine a law-
yer attempting to explain to her pro-life client that the Court upheld the law in Hill pri-
marily on the grounds that the restrictions on his ‘protests, education and counseling’ 
were not based on the content of his speech.”).   
 214.  Lefemine, 672 F.3d at 300 (citing Hill, 530 U.S. at 715; Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 
470 (4th Cir. 2003)).  Specifically, the Lefemine court acknowledged that “this Court had 
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government’s purpose, specifically, whether the government restrict-
ed the speech at issue because it disagreed with its message, is the 
“controlling consideration” when determining content neutrality.215  
If a court may simply construe a government’s restriction as content-
neutral, even when the restriction responds directly to the graphic na-
ture of the particular message conveyed, then the foundation of First 
Amendment jurisprudence will no doubt be threatened by this disin-
genuous application of a two-tiered content-based versus content-
neutral scheme.216 
In addition, the district court’s analysis in Lefemine, which more 
extensively addressed the violation of Lefemine’s First Amendment 
rights to freedom of speech and assembly,217 is troubling for two pri-
mary reasons— both of these reasons further illuminate the confusion 
surrounding the two-tiered content-based versus content-neutral 
scheme.  First, in concluding that the defendants’ restrictions were 
content-based, the court stated: “Despite [the] Defendants’ argument 
that traffic safety was a compelling interest, in his conversation with 
Lefemine, Major Smith did not mention traffic safety as his reason for 
wanting the graphic signs down.”218  This statement reveals a conces-
sion from the district court that if the defendants had been savvy in 
how they framed their restriction to Lefemine—by merely stating that 
the protesters were interfering with and endangering traffic safety—
then they might have been able to successfully argue that the re-
striction was content-neutral and thus subject to a lower level of scru-
tiny.219  It appears unlikely, however, that the district court would have 
been so disingenuous as to intend or permit this result.220  Second, the 
                                                        
indicated in at least one anti-abortion protest case that ‘the State may act to protect its sub-
stantial and legitimate interest in traffic safety.’”  Id. (quoting Lytle, 326 F.3d at 470).  
 215.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (2009). 
 216.  Cf. McDonald, supra note 213, at 1407–08 (“[Hill] is the poster child, then, for a 
deeply flawed free speech doctrine rather than a Court that took leave of its common 
sense in calling the restriction at issue ‘content-neutral.’”). 
 217.  See generally Lefemine v. Davis, 732 F. Supp. 2d 614, 620–24 (D.S.C. 2010), aff’d, 
Lefemine v. Wideman 672 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 9 
(2012). 
 218.  Id. at 623. 
 219.  Cf. McDonald, supra note 213, at 1406 (“It hardly needs pointing out that it is 
normally not difficult to come up with a reasonable sounding content-neutral justification 
for a regulation that is covertly designed to suppress certain expression.  The [Supreme] 
Court, moreover, is usually reluctant to question or inquire into the true motivations of its 
co-equal branches of government, even if a predominant motive did exist that differed 
from the asserted purpose for a regulation.”).  
 220.  It appears that the only reference to a traffic safety argument from the defendants 
came from the Incident Report Lt. Miles prepared after arriving at the scene of the 
demonstration.  See Lefemine, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 623 (“‘I told Mr. Lefemine that he would 
have to quit using the blow horn while showing the photographs because it was disturbing 
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district court rejected the defendants’ argument that their restriction 
was not motivated by disapproval of Lefemine’s pro-life stance.221  In 
rejecting that argument, however, the district court’s analysis con-
fused viewpoint and content neutrality in the same manner in which 
the court proclaimed that the defendants had confused the distinc-
tion.  For example, the district court noted that the speech restriction 
at issue “was motivated solely based upon the content of the graphic 
signs”222—this statement suggests that the court in fact equated graph-
ic content (depictions of aborted fetuses) with an implicit viewpoint 
(opposition to abortion).  The district court seems to have made this 
determination in part because the defendants failed to sufficiently 
prove content-neutral concerns.223  Why, however, would the district 
court concern itself with whether the defendants properly supported 
their content-neutral concerns if viewpoint neutrality plays no part in 
discerning content neutrality?  It appears, therefore, that the district 
court’s finding that the restriction on Lefemine’s speech was content-
based largely arose out of an implicit bias against the defendants’ 
viewpoint. 
                                                        
people and upsetting traffic flow.’” (citation omitted)).  The district court noted that the 
record was otherwise “devoid, however, of any evidence of car accidents, unusual or dan-
gerous congestion, or any similar traffic concerns.”  Id.  As a result, the court “f[ou]nd[] 
that traffic safety, under the facts of th[e] case, was not a compelling interest to justify 
[the] Defendants’ restriction.”  Id.   
 221.  See id. at 621–22 (“While [the] Defendants contend that their restriction is con-
tent-neutral because it was not motivated by disapproval or disagreement with [Lefem-
ine]’s pro-life stance, this argument confuses viewpoint neutrality with content neutrali-
ty.”).  The district court relied on prior Supreme Court precedent to support the 
proposition that viewpoint neutrality and content neutrality are not one and the same.  See 
id. at 621 (“The United States Supreme Court has consistently ‘rejected the argument that 
viewpoint neutrality equals content neutrality.’” (quoting Capital Area Right to Life, Inc. v. 
Downtown Frankfurt, Inc., 511 U.S. 1135, 1135 (1994) (O’Connor, J., dissenting))).  The 
district court acknowledged that “‘content-neutral speech restrictions . . . are justified with-
out reference to the content of the regulated speech.’”  Id. at 622 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 
485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988)); see also 1 SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:9 
(3d ed. 1996) (“A content-based regulation either explicitly or implicitly presumes to regu-
late speech on the basis of the substance of the message.  A viewpoint-based law goes be-
yond mere content-based discrimination and regulates speech based upon agreement or 
disagreement with the particular position the speaker wishes to express.  Viewpoint dis-
crimination is a subset of content discrimination; all viewpoint discrimination is first con-
tent discrimination, but not all content discrimination is viewpoint discrimination.”  (foot-
notes omitted)). 
 222.  Lefemine, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 622 (emphasis added). 
 223.  See id. at 623 (“Despite [the] Defendants’ argument that traffic safety was a com-
pelling interest, in his conversation with [Lefemine], Major Smith did not mention traffic 
safety as his reason for wanting the graphic signs down.  The record evidences that two cit-
izens made complaints; however, neither complaint stated that the signs were interfering 
with traffic.” (footnote omitted)); see also supra note 220. 
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B.  Discarding the Content-Based Versus Content-Neutral Inquiry in 
Favor of a Single Strict Scrutiny Standard Would Eliminate Judicial 
Confusion and Promote Consistency for Courts Analyzing Future First 
Amendment Violations in the Anti-Abortion Protest Context 
The Supreme Court has carved out three categories to help 
frame its analysis of First Amendment violations in different public lo-
cations,224 each of which warrants a different level of judicial scruti-
ny.225  There should likewise be a judicially mandated categorical ex-
ception for anti-abortion protests that abolishes the content-neutral 
versus content-based distinction.226  The emotionally charged nature 
of anti-abortion protests, combined with the difficulty in distinguish-
ing the message from the restriction, has resulted in disparate appli-
cation of the two-tiered scheme by the Supreme Court in many con-
texts.227  In those cases before the Supreme Court that have upheld 
certain restrictions on anti-abortion protesters, the dissenting Justices 
have consistently characterized the regulations at issue as content- or 
viewpoint-based,228 while the majority has characterized the regula-
                                                        
 224.  See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 
(1983) (articulating the public forum doctrine and describing the manner in which states 
may impose restrictions on speech in each of three distinct categories of public property: 
(1) the “quintessential public forum[],” namely “streets and parks which ‘have immemori-
ally been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions,’” (2) “public property which the state has opened for use by the public as a 
place for expressive activity,” and (3) “[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or desig-
nation a forum for public communication” (citations omitted)); see also Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802–04 (1985) (discussing “the tradi-
tional public forum, the public forum created by government designation, and the non-
public forum” identified by the Perry Court). 
 225.  For a general discussion of the relationship between the nature of the public fo-
rum and the level of judicial deference, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 88–94 (1987) (acknowledging that “existing doctrine divides public 
property into three categories,” which may affect the standard of review and observing that 
“it seems clear . . . that the [Supreme] Court does indeed apply different standards of re-
view to public forums and nonpublic forums”). 
 226.  Cf. Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 615, 617 (1991) (“The [Supreme] Court, with the concurrence of most commenta-
tors, has interpreted content discrimination quite narrowly as involving a particular type of 
government purpose served by the regulation of speech.  It has, therefore, ignored other 
types of content discrimination unrelated to the government’s purpose. This refusal to 
recognize other types of content discrimination has resulted in the systematic underpro-
tection of speech and serious doctrinal confusion.”). 
 227.  See Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget Mal-
leable Doctrine, 13 COMMC’N. L. & POL’Y 131, 144 (2008) (noting that the majorities and 
dissents in recent anti-abortion protest cases have reached different results by adopting 
conflicting approaches and methodologies).   
 228.  See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 795 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“I think the injunction in the 
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tions as content-neutral.229  As one scholar has so aptly noted, “the ill-
defined viewpoint and content concepts . . . make it even easier for a 
justice’s ‘rooting interests’ to steer his or her decision in these cases 
involving such divisive social issues.”230 
By removing the content-neutral versus content-based distinction 
and applying a blanket standard of strict scrutiny to all restrictions on 
anti-abortion protest speech, courts can begin the inquiry by looking 
directly to the compelling government interest furthered by limiting 
such speech.231  While Lefemine did not involve a speech-restricting in-
junction, the real danger is that any form of anti-abortion protest 
speech “lends itself . . . to the targeted suppression of particular ide-
as.”232  The unavoidable “targeting” problem makes it nearly impossi-
ble to apply the two-tiered content-neutral and content-based scheme 
in a meaningful manner.  For example, the Madsen Court’s re-
wording of the intermediate scrutiny standard for content-neutral in-
junctions that restrict speech suggests that there is no conceptual 
space for this two-tiered scheme in the anti-abortion protest con-
text.233  In addressing the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny 
analysis, courts should apply a “totality of the circumstances” ap-
proach234—this approach would enable courts to assess the value of 
                                                        
present case was content based (indeed, viewpoint based) to boot.”); cf. Hill v. Colorado, 
530 U.S. 703, 741 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What is before us, after all, is a speech 
regulation directed against the opponents of abortion, and it therefore enjoys the benefit 
of the ‘ad hoc nullification machine’ that the Court has set in motion to push aside what-
ever doctrines of constitutional law stand in the way of that highly favored practice.”).   
 229.  See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763–65 (majority opinion) (determining that injunction 
issued against a group of abortion protesters was content neutral because it was directed at 
the group’s prior unlawful conduct, and thus was adopted without reference to the con-
tent of the speech); see also Hill, 530 U.S. at 719–23 (majority opinion) (reasoning that the 
Colorado law at issue was content neutral because (1) “it [wa]s not a ‘regulation of 
speech,’” (2) “it [wa]s not adopted ‘because of disagreement with the message it conveys,’” 
and (3) “the State’s interests in protecting access and privacy, and providing the police 
with clear guidance, [we]re unrelated to the content of the demonstrators’ speech”). 
 230.  See Kozlowski, supra note 227, at 138. 
 231.  For policies and reasons, supported by precedent, that favor subjecting speech-
restricting injunctions to strict scrutiny, even where such restrictions are not content-
based, see Madsen, 512 U.S. at 790–800 (Scalia, concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part).   
 232.  See id. at 793 (referring to “a speech-restricting injunction”).  
 233.  See id. at 765 (majority opinion) (“[W]hen evaluating a content-neutral injunction, 
we think that our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigorous.”); 
id. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting 
that the “Court has left a powerful loaded weapon lying about today[,]” for “[t]he proposi-
tion that injunctions against speech are subject to a standard indistinguishable from . . . 
the ‘intermediate scrutiny’ standard . . . ought to give all friends of liberty great concern”); 
see also supra text accompanying notes 118–119. 
 234.  As one scholar has noted, in assessing the constitutional value of speech, specifi-
cally “the degree of tailoring required,” one proposal for reform argues that “free speech 
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the suppressed speech and balance the multitude of interests at stake 
without first pigeonholing these cases into the content-based or con-
tent-neutral camp.235  Finally, it is worth noting that a single strict scru-
tiny standard is appropriate in the anti-abortion protest context be-
cause it ensures that content-based regulations masquerading as 
content-neutral regulations will not go unnoticed by the courts.236  Ul-
timately, a strict scrutiny standard would limit the possibility that a 
court would reach an outcome-determinative decision. 
Applying a blanket strict scrutiny standard does have its short-
comings.  For example, the Supreme Court has specifically recog-
nized that obscenity should not be afforded First Amendment protec-
tion.237  In the context of anti-abortion protest speech then, at least 
two possible caveats exist. On the one hand, a court could redirect 
certain anti-abortion protest cases, particularly those involving the 
display of aborted fetuses and other disturbing images, into the realm 
of obscenity due to their objectively graphic nature.  On the other 
hand, a court may decide to afford weighty consideration to the gov-
ernment’s interest in morals legislation.238  In spite of arguments on 
                                                        
cases are said to ‘involve the interaction of five variables: content, character, context, na-
ture, and scope.’”  R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: 
The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333, 358–59 (2006) (footnotes 
omitted).   
 235.  Cf. Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-Based 
and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 808 (2004) (“I 
suggest that by considering these five factors [of content, character, context, nature, and 
scope], the [Supreme] Court should be able to estimate the value of the expression that is 
being suppressed, and may then use that estimation of value to calibrate the quantum of 
proof that the State must offer to justify the regulation of expression.  The same five fac-
tors are also relevant in determining whether the law could be more narrowly tailored, 
that is, less restrictive of expression.”). 
 236.  Examples from other contexts suggest that the two-tiered content-based versus 
content-neutral scheme has enabled courts to characterize truly content-based restrictions 
as content-neutral ones to avoid heightened scrutiny.  See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49–53 (1986) (treating an ordinance that regulated the loca-
tions of adult entertainment theaters as content-neutral because the regulation targeted 
only the secondary effects of such speech, and thus had only an incidental impact on protect-
ed speech). 
 237.  See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (“[W]e have today reaf-
firmed the basic holding of Roth v. United States that obscene material has no protection 
under the First Amendment”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (“We hold 
that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”). 
 238.  As one scholar recently noted, however, many state and lower federal courts have 
inconsistently interpreted the recent Lawrence Court’s sanctioning of morals legislation—
some courts argue that morals legislation is still a robust doctrine while other courts be-
lieve the Court’s decision in Lawrence marks a new era in the decline of morals legislation.  
Cf. Manuel Possolo, Morals Legislation After Lawrence: Can States Criminalize the Sale of Sexual 
Devices? 65 STAN. L. REV. 565, 566–67 (2013) (adopting the view that the Lawrence Court 
appears to have embraced “a new, much more restrictive approach to morals legislation”). 
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either side of the morals legislation debate, both the line of obscenity 
and recent abortion cases appear to re-affirm the Court’s approval of 
such legislation.  For example, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,239 the 
Supreme Court acknowledged the moral underpinnings of obscenity 
law, reasoning that, “[i]n an unbroken series of cases extending over 
a long stretch of this Court’s history, it has been accepted as a postu-
late that ‘the primary requirements of decency may be enforced 
against obscene publications.’”240  Almost thirty-five years later, in Gon-
zales, the Court noted that “[t]he government may use its voice and its 
regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within 
the woman.”241  While anti-abortion protesters’ views are seemingly 
aligned with the government’s interest in respecting and protecting 
the life within a woman,242 courts, however, may not be so lenient in 
affording First Amendment protection to graphic and disturbing anti-
abortion protest displays. 
When courts apply a blanket standard of strict scrutiny to all gov-
ernment restrictions in the anti-abortion protest context, this Note 
proposes that the result should be a healthy balance between preserv-
ing the First Amendment right to free speech, on the one hand, and 
respecting those recognized important government interests, on the 
other hand.  Eliminating the content-based versus content-neutral dis-
tinction will help extinguish judicial confusion and disparate out-
comes.243  This approach is certainly not infallible, as courts could still 
redirect certain anti-abortion protest cases into the realm of obsceni-
ty, thus affording anti-abortion protesters limited First Amendment 
protection.  Nonetheless, it is an improvement that will allow for more 
concrete guidance in the future. 
                                                        
 239.  413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
 240.  Id. at 57 (citations omitted).  
 241.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007). 
 242.  See supra Part II.D. 
 243.  Cf. David S. Day, The Hybridization of the Content-Neutral Standards for the Free Speech 
Clause, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 195, 196 (1987) (noting that under a “two-track approach, gov-
ernmental regulations of the ‘content’ of protected speech appear to receive a higher level 
of judicial scrutiny than do governmental regulations which are purportedly ‘content-
neutral,’” and that the “two-track system, like any analytical model, does not perfectly de-
scribe the [Supreme] Court’s approach [because t]he Court has frequently strayed from a 
strict application of the two-track system”). 
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C.  Roe, Casey, and Gonzales Establish a Useful Framework for 
Understanding the First Amendment Rights of Anti-Abortion 
Protesters 
As Roe, Casey, and Gonzales suggest, increased state interference 
with a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy has slowly erod-
ed a woman’s personal liberty in this arena.244  In the aftermath of Roe, 
the plurality in Casey observed: “The very notion that the State has a 
substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all 
regulations must be deemed unwarranted[, meaning that n]ot all 
burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will 
be undue.”245  For example, a plurality of the Casey Court upheld a 
statutory provision that mandated a woman wait twenty-four hours af-
ter receiving information about the status of the fetus and about pos-
sible alternatives before choosing to terminate her pregnancy.246  Cer-
tainly, a woman could deem such information unwarranted and find 
the waiting period to be an impermissible invasion of personal free-
dom and choice, but the Supreme Court has sanctioned this result.247  
If a state may curtail a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy for 
the reasons set forth in Casey—arguably demoting a woman’s other-
wise fundamental right to choose to terminate her pregnancy in the 
interest of maternal health and potential human life—it would thus 
be counterintuitive to restrict anti-abortion protest speech on these 
same grounds. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Lefemine v. Wideman, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision that law enforcement officers who restricted the 
speech of anti-abortion protesters were entitled to qualified immuni-
ty.248  This Note, however, addresses an issue that neither party ad-
dressed on appeal to the Fourth Circuit—the determination that the 
defendants violated Lefemine’s First Amendment rights.249  The 
Fourth Circuit and, to a lesser extent, the U.S. District Court for the 
                                                        
 244.  See supra Part II.D. 
 245.  505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).   
 246.  Id. at 881–87. 
 247.  For example, the Casey plurality reasoned that by “attempting to ensure that a 
woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate 
purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an [un-informed] abortion.”  Id. at 
882.  The plurality also suggested that the waiting period aligns the interests of the State 
and the woman seeking the abortion by protecting the woman from the “devastating psy-
chological consequences” of a decision that “was not fully informed.”  Id.   
 248.  See supra Part III. 
 249.  See supra text accompanying notes 54, 159, 195. 
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District of South Carolina relied on ambiguous precedent regarding 
content-based versus content-neutral restrictions on protected 
speech.250  This Note proposes that, because the two-tiered scheme for 
determining the constitutionality of restrictions on anti-abortion pro-
test speech promotes judicial confusion, courts should eliminate this 
inquiry and apply a blanket standard of strict scrutiny to all re-
strictions on this type of speech.251  Roe, Casey, and Gonzales reflect the 
narrowing of a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, which is 
evident in decisions that permit increased state interference with this 
right.252  Consistent with the permissible state interferences articulated 
by the trio of abortion cases, anti-abortion protesters should likewise 
be given greater latitude to disseminate their views to the public.253 
                                                        
 250.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 251.  See supra Part IV.B.  
 252.  See supra Part II.D. 
 253.  See supra Part IV.C. 
